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Abstract: New more powerful therapies for the treatment of multiple sclerosis may also confer 
a potential for unprecedented life-endangering side effects. How does a physician respond to a 
patient’s request for a treatment the benefit of which cannot be clearly established as worth its 
risk? The current challenge with prescription of natalizumab (Tysabri®, Biogen Idec) is used to 
illustrate how this conflict creates an opportunity to re-examine our goals as physicians and the 
nature of the physician–patient relationship. Understanding the physician’s role in that partner-
ship, and the ethical and psychological issues impacting on how reasonable risk is determined, 
can improve the neurologist’s capacity to explicate such quandaries. Redefining what is required 
to mediate disagreement between doctors and patients about reasonable risk is at the heart of 
why many of us became physicians. However, such nuanced interpersonal dynamics of patient 
care can be neglected due to the time and resource pressures of our practices. These demands 
have increased the seductiveness of the efficiencies promoted by the trend toward the pseudo-
objectification of evidence-based care, which has arguably monopolized the healing conversation 
often to the detriment of the shared narrative. We examine and attempt to reframe the fiduciary 
and biopsychosocial contretemps of the doctor and patient disagreeing on risk, emphasizing its 
humanistic, relational dimensions.
Keywords: multiple sclerosis, natalizumab, medical ethics, medical decision-making, 
  patient-physician relationship
Introduction
Neurologists treating patients with multiple sclerosis (MS) have emerging therapy 
choices that offer potential improved benefit over non-treatment, and perhaps may be 
superior to previous options. New research promises to expand the armamentarium to 
include medications with novel mechanisms of actions and more tolerable routes of 
administration than frequent, self-injected therapy. Oral therapies and IV therapies with 
infrequent dosing requirements – albeit with risks not previously relevant to the MS 
therapy decision process – are available now or will become so in the near future.
The years since FDA approval of the beta-interferons (IFN-Beta1a IM (Avonex®), 
IFN-Beta1b (Betaseron®, Extavia®), IFN-Beta1a SQ (Rebif®), and glatiramer acetate 
(Copaxone®) may have lulled the MS community into a false sense of security, given the 
relatively low toxicity and modest side effect profiles of these so-called platform drugs. 
We are lulled no longer. The more recently approved natalizumab (Tysabri®, Biogen 
Idec) and fingolimod (Gilenya®, Novartis) have demonstrated what may be increased 
effectiveness in control of the disease compared to the previous platform therapies, 
using relapse rates, progression of disability, and MRI T2, T1, and Gd+   enhancement Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2011:7 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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lesions as outcome measures in controlled trials.1–5 Though 
generally well tolerated, progressive multifocal leukoen-
cephalopathy (PML), a currently untreatable viral infection 
of the brain that may cause severe disability or death, and 
other opportunistic infections, are associated with Tysabri 
use. Gilenya, recently FDA-approved for relapsing forms 
of MS, is associated with significant increased risk of 
herpesvirus-related primary and re-activation infections, 
along with bradyarrhythmias and ophthalmologic, derma-
tologic, hepatic, and pulmonary complications. In spite of 
these issues, Tysabri’s once-monthly infusion schedule, and 
Gilenya’s ease of use as an oral daily therapy, are compelling 
reasons for their being considered for patients with relapsing 
forms of MS. Other emergent therapies such as rituximab, 
ocrilizumab, alumtuzumab, cladribine, and daclizumab may 
be associated with PML, extra-CNS toxicities, autoimmune 
diseases other than MS, as well as possible increased risks 
for opportunistic infections and secondary malignancies. 
Other drugs that may enter the market in the near future as 
oral therapies trade off minimized health risk for more mod-
est efficacy claims. Doctors and patients alike are reasonably 
concerned about the potential for undue harm with the more 
powerful drugs, and with compromising benefit to minimize 
risk with the others. Even given these issues, patients may 
find the potential quality of life aspects of the new therapies 
compelling.
The choice to start, stop, or change a drug has multi-
dimensional societal implications, for government oversight 
organizations and committees, healthcare insurers, managed 
care organizations, as well as at the point of contact in the 
clinic. A therapy’s cost to, and value for, policy-makers and 
the healthcare market have increasingly become a part of 
the neurology treatment delivery equation. The existential 
question, however, beyond resource utilization and the greater 
good, is mostly confronted in the process of decision-making 
in the exam room between the patient and physician, and 
centers on what value-basis it is worth putting this particular 
patient’s life at risk. That judgment requires in no small part a 
shared assessment of both known and unknown medical risks 
and benefits of the medication. And, as is well recognized, the 
benefits of choosing or changing therapy, beyond potential 
long-term medical outcomes and treatment success, hinge 
on patient satisfaction and compliance.
It is the aim of this essay to argue that the decision-making 
process must also navigate through the ways that the patient 
and the physician may collaborate in the process of recogniz-
ing and sharing not just the facts, but also the feelings and 
motivations that each of them, doctor and patient, brings to 
risk assessment, and the iterative process of revisiting the deci-
sion as that patient’s disease, and medical choices evolve.
In their 2009 Annals of Neurology editorial, Hauser and 
Johnston elucidated the issues facing those who must weigh 
the risks and benefits of higher risk MS therapy like Tysabri.6 
They appealed to the doctor’s capacity to practice the art of 
medicine when the choices are not clear-cut, and noted that 
awareness of the personal biases in fulfilling one’s role as 
educator and expert are essential in helping patients as they 
consider and reconcile to the potential risks of a therapy. What 
does this process entail from the standpoint of concatenating 
objective and scientific evidence-based valuation, with the 
subjectivity inherent in the psychologically rich, meaningful, 
empathic, and compassionate communication of the doctor–
patient encounter?
The case below exemplifies what may happen after the 
facts are known and shared to a reasonable and acceptable 
extent, all tests are performed and interpreted, the uncer-
tainties expressed as numerators and denominators, and the 
options laid out – but no consensus can be established on how 
to proceed. The solutions then suggested are, essentially, how 
to reformulate the question being asked. I have written this 
essay as a neurologist reaching out to fellow physicians, but 
there is no intent to exclude any and all interested or relevant 
parties from the conversation.
Case vignette
Ms S is a 35-year-old married attorney with two children. 
She runs marathons, sometimes pushing her running stroller 
for miles during practice. Her six-year history of MS started 
with a mixed optic neuritis and hemi-lateral sensory loss that 
resolved to near normal. Her screening MRIs showed three 
brain lesions and one in the cervical cord. At her request, 
therapy was initiated at the clinically isolated syndrome 
(CIS) stage – a decision with which her doctor agreed, given 
her probable high risk for subsequent conversion to definite 
MS.7,8 She has required high dose steroids twice for worsen-
ing of symptoms in the same distribution, despite treatment 
with high-dose interferon with good compliance. Her neu-
rologic disability, as measured using the Kurtzke Extended 
Disability Status Scale (EDSS), remains minimally abnormal 
at 2.0, with optic pallor and some unilateral nonrefractable 
reduction in visual acuity,9 along with the sensory loss on 
her dominant side.
Ms S reports that she has had no new neurologic symp-
toms since her last visit. Her exam has not changed apprecia-
bly and her MRIs have been stable until the most recent study, 
done for this visit, which shows one new 2 cm T2 lesion in Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2011:7 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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the left posterior parietal white matter. Her neurologist has 
told her that it does not unequivocably warrant a change in 
her therapy.
She returns in two weeks for a requested counseling visit. 
Ms S is aware of new therapies available on the market and 
in development that would replace her self-administered 
  injections. She believes she will have improved treatment 
success and long-term quality of life if she switches to   Tysabri, 
and requests that it be prescribed for her. She is aware of, and 
comfortable with the risks as described in the scientific and lay 
literature, package insert and assent, which she has assembled 
in a portfolio and refers to during her visits.
The neurologist’s opinion is that it is not clear that the 
benefits of Tysabri’s use in this case outweigh the rare chance 
of a serious adverse event. He considers burdening the patient 
with off-prints of important literature, having a nurse come 
in to reason with her, even referring her for counseling with 
the group’s social worker or psychologist. As her physician, 
he knows that she is comfortable trusting her intuition after 
having researched a problem, talked it through, processed it 
and come to a decision. She is outspoken and commanding, 
emphatic, and sure of herself; discussions with her can be 
more like sparring with a courtroom adversary than like an 
expert with the supplicant patient. These personal qualities, 
and a capacity for research and self-advocacy, which she can 
value over and above the physician’s expertise and opinion, 
have created tensions in her medical care. The physician 
is also aware that she shares her decision-making process 
with her younger spouse, a motocross daredevil who enjoys 
bungee jumping with her from bridges.
The physician realizes that applying some insights into 
the psychology of the decision-making process – both Ms. S’s 
and the physician’s – would contribute to managing the dif-
ferences of opinion. The degree to which Ms S’s ostensible 
comfort with risk outweighs the cautionary issues brought 
up with her, and has interpersonal and ethical   implications. 
Ms S’s request is not uncommon for neurologists to have 
to consider, and is increasingly being encountered in MS 
clinical practice. The physician emphasized with Ms S that 
it was critical for them both to value her way of arriving at 
her decisions, imbedded in that unique doctor-patient rela-
tionship. The physician suggested that exploring the patient’s 
narrative, properly elucidated and clarified, could possibly 
suggest a solution to their disagreement. She agreed to this 
strategy.
In their subsequent discussions, Ms S realized – with 
the doctor’s help – that the disagreement on risk was not 
just about the drug, or even the disease per se. The shared 
dilemma offered an opportunity for the discussion to move to 
a deeper level of motivation and intent. They discovered that 
underlying the ostensible issue of drug risk was the existential 
dilemma of Ms S’s desire to control her life, and reconcile 
that need with other critical needs, feelings, and desires that 
were perhaps more difficult to identify and   manage. She 
became aware that this decision involved how she shared her 
life and values with others, and that the relational dynamics 
arising from such crises affected not just specific decisions 
such as the choice of her MS therapy, but also her capacity 
to deepen self understanding and insight.
The discussion turned to issues of the patient’s sense 
of the vulnerability of her well-being, along with fears of 
loss of independence and power, her desire to have more 
children, the state of her marriage, the roles she played in 
her social constellations, attitudes about her employment, 
and her approach to psychological insight. The physician 
was able to reflect back to her how their shared approach to 
articulating these issues affected how Ms S’s personal and 
medical choices were formed, as well as how she interacted 
with physicians and others in the process of establishing 
value and meaning. This allowed a mutual re-framing of the 
issues at hand, as well as a better understanding of the ways 
the doctor–patient relationship could facilitate and value such 
communication. This took several sessions, and referral to a 
clinical psychologist for co-management, during which time 
the decision to change treatment was postponed. At this time, 
she is off all medications in anticipation of another pregnancy, 
and the decision to start Tysabri will be revisited after this 
next child is born.
The special case of Tysabri
There are over-arching general principles to which this essay 
will subscribe. However, instead of propounding this or 
that manifesto in an abstract, top-down manner, our way to 
  wisdom is from the bottom up, starting with the particulars of 
a real-life situation that has the usual welter of complexify-
ing factors that are the norm in clinical practice. Prioritizing 
the uniqueness of the patient narrative, and the physician’s 
ways of responding to it, are critical to the principles that 
are advocated.
In situations in which patients are doing poorly on plat-
form therapy, escalation to a treatment with increased risk 
may be a reasonable option. Indeed, ongoing discovery of 
the occult immunopathology of the disease suggests that 
patients may benefit from more aggressive early treatment 
to prevent later disability.10,11 However, in situations such as 
profiled in our vignette of Ms S, the patient may be realizing Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2011:7 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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reasonable success with a first-line therapy at least according 
to our current assessment strategies. She is not toxic on her 
present therapy, nor is she noncompliant. In the clinical trial 
literature relevant to this case, even though Tysabri decreased 
MS-related disease activity very effectively when it was 
tested against placebo, it has yet to be tested in head-to-head 
trials comparing it to other available or emerging therapies. 
(Recall that the AFFIRM trial was a two arm trial with a 
placebo control group, and SENTINEL used the combination 
of Tysabri and Avonex compared to Avonex alone; there was 
no Tysabri-only cohort.) Tysabri has not been indicated by 
the FDA, nor universally empirically accepted as, a therapy 
to be given to patients who have not exhausted a platform 
therapy.12–14 Whether the new MRI lesion qualifies as evi-
dence of inadequate treatment response is controversial and 
not currently understood.
Thus, we have little data to support an alternative therapy 
on the benefit side, and we cannot identify any mitigation of 
risk specific to her case that would support a safety-associated 
justification for change in therapy. Unless a zero tolerance 
policy is established for any new clinical or radiological activ-
ity due to MS as our threshold for adequate versus inadequate 
therapy, the presence of the new MR lesion is not necessarily 
connoting a loss of efficacy. As well, using present methods we 
have few ways of assessing an improvement in her treatment 
response on a riskier therapy. Measuring a potential benefit 
in such situations is problematic given the lack of sensitivity 
of our surrogate markers of the disease in clinical practice, 
and paucity of adequate long-term follow-up of patients on 
any MS therapy. There also may be unforeseen future risks 
that these immunosuppressive therapies portend, especially in 
young patients with long post-exposure life expectancies.
What risks would be deemed acceptable in this situation? 
If a medication offers a 1/10,000, or even a 1/1000 chance of 
possibly fatal complications, but an enhanced quality of life, 
would that be a tolerable risk? If patients are young and in 
good health, like Ms. S., do we expect them to take more risk, 
or less, than those who are older, or more disabled? One of the 
unspoken expectations many have allowed to creep into the 
risk-benefit process for MS is that the older or more disabled 
the patients, the less they putatively have to lose, and the more 
risk they can tolerate. The logic behind this is inadequate to 
support the thesis, given any real-life experience with patients 
who have complex and idiosyncratic ways of establishing 
reasonable risk. Heesen et al found that patients, regardless 
of their disability status, were significantly more likely than 
physicians to accept higher risks of PML, an opinion that 
could not be explained by risk calculation abilities or lack of 
understanding.15 It is not surprising, given these findings, that 
the field of evidence-based metrics of healthcare outcomes 
has had to supply hypothetical values for estimating benefits 
for patients with multiple sclerosis to establish data based on 
quality of life years.16
Doctors are often risk-averse, and may look for reasons 
to affirm a psychologically (and medico-legally) safe 
position.15,17 However, if Tysabri resulted in a persistent and 
superior reduction of MS clinical and radiological activity over 
years, the incremental benefit might be worthwhile even for 
patients with few lesions and relatively benign disease. For Ms 
S, with her commitment to running, and personal and physical 
independence as major themes in her life, the relative benefit 
might allow her to preserve her activities for a longer duration, 
conferring significant improvement in quality of life.
Given the number of ways one might define the priorities 
in this process, it may be quite difficult for a physician to 
assess the potential benefits for an individual patient on any 
MS therapy. In the case of Tysabri, the situation is even more 
complex: the toxicity issue is a moving target. Surveillance 
and vigilance protocols for diagnosis and treatment of PML 
are still being developed. Up-to-date incidence numbers, and 
the consequences of the diagnosis, which may fall on a broad 
spectrum of resultant disease severity and outcomes after treat-
ment, are not part of TOUCHTM, the US registry associated 
with Tysabri’s FDA-mandated Risk Evaluation and Mitigation 
Strategy (REMS),18 and as such are not considered to fall under 
research protocol reporting requirements. Thus, the timely 
dissemination and full explication and follow-up of serious 
adverse events, such as that required by participant protections 
in research, are not mandated duties for the sponsor or the 
physician. Arguments for the incorporation of research aims 
and oversight for such REMS programs have been made.19
Medical decision-making
When healthcare decisions incorporate some uncertainty (as 
most do), physicians and their patients engage in a shared 
risk-benefit analysis to determine the relative benefit of a 
course of action.20 The physician may know (or needs to make 
an informed guess) about the relative risk associated with 
possible complications, eg, organotoxicity, the risk of PML, 
malignancy, or infection associated with a given   medication. 
The physician may be biased by personal experience, as 
Hauser and Johnson point out,6 but ideally an attempt is made 
to imbed an opinion in the available research,   reflecting the 
expert community’s consensus. Hurst et al found that in facing 
ethically difficult decisions, the internists they surveyed sought 
to avoid conflict, obtain assistance, and protect the integrity of Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2011:7 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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their conscience and reputation as well as the integrity of the 
patient, but that these goals could be in conflict.21
It has yet to be established whether a comparable group 
of neurologists would accede to reaching out to external 
sources to help resolve ethical issues. Many consider them-
selves the reasonable arbiters of such conflicts. As well, many 
neurologists would disagree with this essay’s contention that 
we need to work continuously on our biopsychosocial skill 
set, as we do in fulfilling CME requirements, or using the 
AAN’s Continuum series, to help maintain our knowledge 
base about neurologic disease and therapy. Those holding 
this contrarian position are likely to look askance at any 
discussion of physician as “healer”, and will argue that 
one should be more concerned about a grasp of the facts 
and demonstrated competence at the craft than these more 
intuitional issues.
Suffice it to say that physicians are not the first to come up 
against the tensions in the relation of fact to meaning, truth to 
value, logic to feeling, expertise to understanding, knowledge 
to wisdom, science to the humanities. In this process of prac-
ticing medicine, physicians are working with the inheritance 
of wisdom with which they have been gifted, as their guild has 
made its contributions to human health through the centuries.22 
We as physicians can be justifiably proud of how medicine can 
imbed science’s hypothesis-tested, generalizable knowledge 
in the ongoing process of making a society better able to 
satisfy its needs for “eudaemonia” (Plato’s ideal for human 
flourishing). We also are accustomed to being accorded respect 
for how we apply our expertise to our encounters with life and 
death, as doctors with patients. But recently that hegemony 
is being questioned and even doubted. We come up against 
ethics panels and congressional oversight committees con-
cerned about our capacity for decision-making and resolving 
conflicts of interest and commitment. We regularly encounter 
patients confident that they have a better idea about their health 
than their doctor, with data gleaned and opinions formed 
from the Internet, social networking, books, and alternative 
and nontraditional healthcare models. Many Americans are 
riding a sociopolitical wave of distrust for any institutional 
compromise of their individual rights. In this context, many 
physicians are taking a step back to try and understand how 
to help restore people’s trust in their physicians to make the 
hard decisions on what is good healthcare.
How a physician responds to a patient request for a 
particular medication in this setting derives from how one 
understands both the goals of medicine and the nature of the 
physician–patient relationship. There is a psychological and 
sociological context in which such conversations take place, 
which requires the physician’s response to be conditioned 
by the issues arising from this nexus. Verbalizing one’s 
understanding of a patient-initiated desire to switch therapies 
upholds and empowers patients in their capacity as autono-
mous agents, and defines and strengthens their alliance with 
their doctor as well as with the family, friends, and advisors 
who make up their social support   network. If we then weigh 
in with the facts and our expertise, and if the competent, 
nondelusional patient can agree that a reasonable process 
has been pursued how can there be a problem?
Applying models of the patient– 
physician relationship
The physician’s role in the therapeutic alliance has been 
defined with the help of various models of interaction and 
transaction, and a given physician may vary the degree 
to which the models are utilized in different patients and 
situations.20,23 Table 1 itemizes Degner’s continuum of five 
relational styles adopted in medical decision-making by 
patient preference.
Conventionally, physicians may see their role as that of: 
1) a gatekeeper managing access to potentially beneficial 
therapies; 2) a dispenser of knowledge and treatments from 
the privileged perspective earned by training and experience; 
or 3) as a business person offering a service and commodity 
that includes access to reasonable medications for paying 
customers.24–26 Whether these roles exhaust the possible ways 
doctors relate to patients has been the subject of much con-
versation about humanistic, patient-centered medicine.26–29
The paternalism that may be invoked when engaging one’s 
expertise and experience in such a decision-making process 
is our inheritance from the last few centuries of medical 
tradition. Several trends, sometimes running counter to one 
another, have allowed that hoary tradition of physician-hood 
to evolve. Notwithstanding the evolutionary effects of a resur-
Table 1 The control preferences statement set
Active roles
A.   i prefer to make the decision about which treatment i will receive. 
(Pure autonomy)
B.   I prefer to make the final decision about my treatment after seriously 
considering my doctor’s opinion. (informed choice)
c.   i prefer that my doctor and i share responsibility for deciding which 
treatment is best for me. (shared decision making)
Passive roles
D.   I prefer that my doctor makes the final decision about which treatment 
will be used, but seriously considers my opinion. (Professional-as-agent)
e.   i prefer to leave all decisions regarding treatment to my doctor. 
(Paternalistic)
Note: Heeson et al48 adapted from Degner et al 1997.Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2011:7 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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gent humanistic medicine and the biopsychosocial model 
of medicine, there is another rather subtler modifier, that is 
influencing how physicians think about their capacity to own 
the information. This blessing/curse has put a new face on the 
sharing of medical care, and that face is actually legion. It is 
now common practice to rely on “evidenced-based” standard-
ized methods of diagnosing and treating medical problems, 
as published in guidelines and algorithms by respected and 
well-intentioned researchers, institutions, and organizations 
in and out of government. Managed care decision makers, 
and all of us who share the dream of scientific medicine for 
the public good, embrace these innovations.
But one can ask, at what cost is this process to the medical 
“moment” in which a doctor and a patient’s criteria for success 
must cohere? Recourse to evidence-based decision-making 
can depersonalize the care we deliver, and delegitimize the 
authority of physicians, from the most caring, compassion-
ate, and nurturing to the most paternalistic. No one argues 
that in many ways the intent of these innovations is virtuous 
and is creating a more powerful, scientifically based medical 
practice. The cautionary point might be to realize and then 
cope with whatever impact this has on us as experts in this 
hybrid mechanic-as-shaman profession. When a patient such 
as that of our vignette has made it clear that she wishes the 
potential benefit of a therapy, and the algorithms guiding 
our work recommend against her doing so, can we be sure 
that the “scientific” process has this particular patient’s best 
interests in mind?
Sharing autonomy
The paternalistic approach is commonly contrasted with a part-
nership model that acknowledges autonomy and self-defensive 
needs for both partners. Theoretically, the physician-patient 
partnership allows the patient to feel comfortable expressing 
confidences and vulnerabilities, which can aid the physician 
in obtaining knowledge necessary for optimal medical care.17 
Medical ethical codes have long recognized this inequality of 
control, and required that the physician-patient relationship 
aspire to the highest standards of virtuous conduct. Dating 
back to the Hippocratic Oath, by which physicians swore 
to act only for the “benefit of the sick, remaining free of all 
intentional injustice, of all mischief”, engaging with patients 
obliges physicians to act for the patient’s best interest, without 
intentional misconduct or causing harm to the patient.25
As in our vignette, respect for autonomy may conflict 
with other principles generally upheld by the medical profes-
sion.  When a proposed treatment poses an increased risk, a 
physician may feel that non-maleficence outweighs the duty 
to respect patient autonomy. At what level of potential harm 
this concern is triggered is of course subject to interpretation. 
In situations involving modest/moderate risk, it might be 
worthwhile to facilitate patient self-determination. Looking 
to societal standards, many activities with associated risk 
are perceived as extreme, but within the bounds of appropri-
ate behaviors. There are many otherwise sane citizens who 
regularly put themselves in harm’s way on double diamond 
downhill ski slopes, at the ends of bungee cords, and in sand-
dune-leaping all terrain vehicles. Risk may be limited by 
rules or laws, eg, requiring helmets, or other safety measures 
– but citizens can and do choose to engage in risky activities 
without compromising their ability to contribute to the social 
good and the individual pursuit of happiness.
Following this tradition, the physician-patient relationship 
confers a duty on the physician to act as a guardian for the 
patient’s best interests, while assuming greater knowledge 
and experience in medical decisions, and an awareness of the 
autonomy accorded the physician as a person with expertise and 
authority in the professional role assumed in the relationship. 
This obligates the physician to prevent harm to the patient. 
For example, when patients ask for excessive narcotics, most 
physicians refuse, using the protection of the patient’s best 
interests as justification. In a partnership model, the physician 
and patient work together toward achieving a meaningful result, 
with the patient participating in decision-making and goal 
setting. Although not necessarily in conflict with a fiduciary 
relationship, a partnership model relies more on cooperation 
and less on the physician’s unilaterally determining the best 
course. The partnership model requires extremely high stan-
dards of interpersonal communication, as patient and physician 
work to establish mutually acceptable goals.30
Conversely, it has been noted that, at the other end of 
the spectrum, when the final decision about medical care 
rests with the patient and the relevant evidence-based algo-
rithm solely, it “can lead to a clinician-patient relationship 
based on contractual considerations rather than on trust”.25 
Given that the central tenet of modern medical practice asserts 
that physicians should respect the autonomy of the patient, it’s 
been opined that physicians can and should allow the patient 
to choose from among medically reasonable alternatives.26 
The ethical quandary arises when the physician and patient 
disagree on which options are “medically” reasonable.
Similarly, in their capacity as the provider end of the 
medical-industrial complex, a physician might readily agree 
to prescribe treatment that has a   less-than-clear   indication. 
For instance, an anti-depressant may be prescribed as a “quick 
fix” for the “blues” at a patient’s request. In such cases, Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2011:7 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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without the possibility of excessive harm, some discussion of 
risks and benefits might satisfy the physician’s need for non-
maleficence (and a means of reaching out to the patient) while 
still recognizing patient autonomy (although firm advice to 
pursue lifestyle changes and/or psychological counseling can 
be reinforced along the way).
In the case of medications with potential for more serious 
harm, this tactic may be inappropriate. By agreeing to pre-
scribe, the physician implicitly takes on legal and moral 
responsibility for the choice of medication,31 even as the 
competent patient provides informed consent and willingly 
accepts the consequences of the decision. (Note: even a 
patient’s diminished cognitive ability may not preclude the 
capacity to make reasonably informed medical decisions).43
As in our case vignette, if the physician declines the 
patient’s request, can that unduly compromise the patient’s 
autonomy? If the physician acquiesces to a medically 
unnecessary request, can that unacceptably compromise the 
physician’s autonomy and/or professional obligations? The 
physician may choose to refrain from prescribing Tysabri 
because of an unwillingness to accept the responsibility for 
potential harm to the patient. One should explain the reasoning 
behind that opinion and encourage dialog about the process. 
It is, of course, critical that there be clear documentation of 
this in the medical record. Nonetheless, no matter what the 
outcome, or whether anyone feels that the ethical obligations 
of justice, beneficence, or the respect for persons were or were 
not honored, there will be an effect of an ultimate disagreement 
on that physician’s alliance with the patient, and that physi-
cian’s subsequent capacity to act as that patient’s caregiver.
Does a Tysabri prescription for a patient on alternative 
therapy constitute minimal, significantly increased, or exces-
sive risk? This is not yet calculable for populations or for 
individuals. As we better understand MS, along with our ways 
of measuring its progress and the success of our interven-
tions, this question’s objective aspects should move closer 
to a consensus answer. Other uncertainties will undoubtedly 
take their place. Physicians will always need to be able to 
negotiate reasonable approaches with each of their patients 
in the face of great uncertainty, while trying to acknowledge 
and protect both the patient’s autonomy and their own. How 
will the application of our “physician’s art” likely resolve the 
case vignette’s conundrum?
Working out the details of 
managing disagreement on risk
There is little in the available literature to guide physicians 
in helping their patients find a clear path on tailoring an MS 
therapy to the individual case. Uncertainties abound concern-
ing the long-term relevance of the primary and   secondary 
endpoints in pivotal clinical trials. And though the age of 
personalized medicine is dawning, there are as yet no sur-
rogate markers that will prospectively identify which drug 
is right for a given patient, or tests that predict success after 
treatments are started, or even short-term ways of knowing 
if that success will come at all. Little is known about the 
long-term safety and efficacy of the newer choices, or what 
restrictions on subsequent alternatives may be relevant if that 
therapy is in turn deemed suboptimal.
Not that the MS community does not recognize ethical 
and communication challenges in the therapy decision-
making process. Christoph Heesen’s group has studied how 
patients in their MS clinic make medical decisions.11,15,32,33 
They document how the various educational and evaluative 
strategies used to establish benefit and risk by patients and 
doctors differ. They have also have established innovative 
tools to allow the two parties’ processes to conform to one 
another’s expectations, including studies on the risk/benefit 
analysis for the use of Tysabri.15 An impressive literature has 
accrued concerning the medical decision-making process 
utilizing qualitative as well as quantitative data.21,29,30,34
Where the risk analysis performed by a doctor and an 
MS patient verge on our vignette’s conundrum has been 
less discussed since Augustus Rose wrote of his task as 
an MS doctor in 1980.35–38 As a community of physicians 
and clinical researchers working with patients and families 
coping with this devastating disease, we have remained 
mostly mute on how one’s practice might accommodate 
the process of such relational decision-making. Indeed, 
this subject was omitted entirely from a recent summation 
of ethical challenges for MS physicians.39 Unless it is a 
one-page apologia or pithy observation that fits neatly in 
between the scientific papers in our favorite journals, such 
conversation is often consigned to a humanities journal 
where, in its obscurity, it will not prey on practicing 
physicians’ consciences.
Even if one “girds loins” and pursues the beast into the 
forbidden garden of non-neuroscience literature, it rapidly 
becomes clear that the writers publishing in these genres 
have often failed to bridge the gap between their laudable 
academic pursuits and the way those ideas can be communi-
cated effectively to those enmeshed in the day-to-day process 
of doctoring. Although there has been much opined, thought 
through, and published in the general subjects of physician–
patient relations, medical decision-making, and the ethical 
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the MS physicians, are, judging from our literature, appar-
ently not participating in the conversation.
The reasons, to be sure, will be many. Beyond the 
sequestration-of-published-conversation issue, we will need 
to admit that, however much the subject may prick our inter-
est, clinical neurologists don’t pursue it because they are busy, 
stressed, and barely can get through the primary professional 
journals, let alone go searching Entrez PubMed to satisfy 
ethical, psychological, and spiritual yearnings. Perhaps we 
believe that, as mature, well-trained professionals, our days 
of learning how to talk and listen to patients are over, and 
no further work need be done to help us hold up our end 
of the physician–patient relationship. The days when one 
passionately read through books on the art of medicine and 
the nature of suffering may seem to be far-off history (with 
apologies to Eric Cassell). And even if the foray is made, 
very few authors one   discovers – let alone we readers – can 
articulate how to move the conversation from a study-find-
ing’s hyper-specificity, or over-generalized abstractions, to 
the life-wrenching, painful, complex, messy circumstances 
that surface in the exam room.
Most critically, beyond what appears in our literature, 
might we physicians confess that our conversations about 
practice, when focused on what we do as doctors, neglect 
how we cope with the subjective, the feeling-states that are 
part of our internal process as we work with patients, along 
with those in the patient that feed their ways of working with 
us? When the focus of the disagreement about risks seems 
to have moved beyond the data, beyond the facts and any 
quantitative, evaluable, literature-supported aspects of the 
decision-making, how do we elucidate and work out the psy-
chological and interpersonal issues efficiently, empathically, 
and successfully? How can we imagine that this discussion is 
something we know how to do well instinctively, and, unlike 
our capacity to assess and analyze data, is a skill that doesn’t 
require practice and improvement?
The problem not re-defined but its 
depth reconsidered – a short aside
This essay does not aim at redefining the patient–physician 
relationship anew; nor does it aspire to establish an algorithm 
for problem-solving the biopsychosocial dimensions of 
this or that MS healthcare conundrum. It speaks to “ethical 
behavior”, as if this idea’s realization in medical care could be 
defined in the same way as “demyelination” or   “axonopathy”. 
One might wish for a one-size-fits-all formalization of 
“right conduct” in our roles as physicians, researchers, and 
  educators. Of course, ethics are nothing like facts about tissues 
and cells, or at least they bound a territory less amenable to 
reductionist explanations. Ethical behavior is not committed 
in   isolation; it describes conduct performed in relation to an 
Other, in a complex context bounded by culture and language; 
and the enactor in this case, the physician, is only a part of 
the experiencing relational whole in which this behavior will 
be judged. However, when we hear the catch-words “ethics” 
or “moral behavior” nowadays, it is mostly in the context 
of bioethics, conversations on the use of stem cells, or end 
of life, or even closer to home, on our control of the flow 
of information and resources between us and the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. In the main, we may have failed to pay attention 
to the larger historical, sociopolitical, and economic context 
of our   profession’s fight to maintain its guild control over its 
work,22 and the moral imperatives that govern our contribu-
tion to the healing encounter. Our articulation of “ethics” 
problems has been mostly reactive in response to the issues 
of managing financial conflicts of interest, and as such, has 
forced us away from the issues concealed below.
Those publicly contentious issues are of course worthy of 
attention. However, this essay’s concern is elsewhere, and in 
some ways deeper. In conversation with colleagues in private 
and academic practices, physicians in all stages and phases of 
their careers, several issues come up repeatedly that are criti-
cally relevant to the issue at hand, and as well seem to go to the 
heart of what we do as doctors.   Neurologists in practice are 
seemingly under the gun to divide their clinic schedules into 
quarter-hours or less to increase volume. They complain that 
there is little time or wherewithal left to engage in that most-
holy work of person-to-person   caring in clinical practice. 
This is often left to a “physician extender”, a euphemism for 
someone less well trained and cheaper than a doctor, whose 
task is to actually listen to and talk with the patient. Many 
neurologists have relinquished an essential piece of what has 
defined what physicians and patients do together.
Given similar constraints on our time and energy by the 
exigencies of day to day duties, it appears that neurologists 
rarely discuss with their colleagues the complexities accom-
panying many medical decisions – scientific issues, of course, 
but also interpersonal and psychological. They complain 
that access to new information about care issues is limited 
by the time we spend seeing more and more patients, doing 
procedures, performing the required paperwork, not to men-
tion complying with the limitations placed by our practice 
or institution on contacts with key opinion leaders, let alone 
medical liaisons and salespersons of drug companies.
It is the author’s impression that the American MS 
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or private practice, is isolated in ways that may compromise 
the practice of good medicine – the capacity to have the time 
and energy to listen; to think; to express and consider; to 
share and reflect, and reframe issues that arise in the practice 
of working up close with the suffering and fearful; and to 
learn and process that learning intellectually, critically, and 
emotionally. That is what this essay is in essence conveying, 
and why this larger perspective is so necessary in order to 
bring our issues into correct focus.
The medical and ethical benefits  
of considering psychological  
aspects of why physician  
and patient disagree
As Heesen et al point out, although patients often perceive 
their disease as more dangerous than their doctor does, their 
knowledge of the objective data is often subordinated to what 
are labeled “other factors” – biopsychosocial nuances – in the 
decision process.32 What one might thus infer is that being 
alert to the psychological issues impacting on how patients 
arrive at certain notions and attitudes can profoundly improve 
a physician’s capacity to help resolve the ethical quanda-
ries that healthcare can present. An evaluative instrument, 
developed to address personal attitude, normative belief, 
and control beliefs contributing to decisional attitude, has 
been presented at ECTRIMS 2010.40 Further study of this 
process by the authors and their coworkers is planned (the 
AutoMS Project).
To the extent that physicians don’t consider themselves 
competent or possessed of the time or energy (or financial 
compensation) to incorporate such aspects of the healing 
encounter into their patient care, many opportunities to imbed 
medical decision-making in a shared defining of goals can 
be missed or under-utilized. A treatment is a failure if the 
patient’s life isn’t improved by it, no matter how effective it 
may be by some objective measure. And that improvement 
can very much be “in the eye of the beholder”. To miss the 
necessity of reconciling different opinions on what consti-
tutes “quality of life” is to lose sight of the goals of medical 
therapy – namely, human flourishing.
In our vignette, Ms S’s age, her desire to have more 
children, her employment, her marriage, her roles in various 
social constellations, and her approach to understanding 
herself and others, will all affect how she interacts with 
physicians, and how her medical choices are formed. 
Making a foray into the psychodynamics of the patient’s 
decision-making illuminates how much Ms S’s approach to 
life taps into traits and behaviors that may be incongruous 
as they persist from previous phases of her life, or are reflec-
tions of significant unresolved internal (intrapsychic) and 
external (social, interpersonal) conflicts that are finding 
expression in this disagreement. It allows us to ask, is 
she using a decision-making process that worked well 
for a single woman in her 20s, but is inappropriate now 
that she is a married mother? Does this strategy reflect her 
inability to grapple with the facts of her mortality and its 
consequences to those who depend on her? And how is her 
relationship with her husband, family, children, her own 
parents, being reflected in this process, and how much is 
the physician obliged to consider these issues with her as 
differences in opinion about risk become clear? Why does 
she, perhaps, want to oppose or conflict with her physician, 
and how does this figure into her psychology and capacity 
to make decisions that truly reflect her best interests? And, 
most importantly, how can such insights allow the physician 
to re-approach the patient with a reframing of the issues 
at hand, and allow the doctor–patient partnership to use 
the opportunity to better understand itself and the values 
it embodies? Who pursues these issues with her, and how 
important is it to work through such difficult material before 
establishing the decision point regarding this treatment 
option? The physician’s awareness of the patient’s goals and 
desires beyond her medication choices, and the capacity 
to help the patient understand herself better, can improve 
insight into the how’s and why’s of her choices, and lead to 
clearer and more productive communication and relational 
decision-making.
Thinking about the psychological forces that motivate 
both the patient and physician provides an additional role 
for the latter in the decision-making process. This sensibil-
ity is the capacity in which the physician serves as a healer 
interacting with a person, an interaction that can be perceived 
from a larger, more holistic, subtle, and complex view of the 
healthcare dyad of physician and patient.41 Francis Peabody’s 
1927 “secret of good patient care is caring for the patient”42 
is one of those pearls of wisdom that might be emblazoned 
on our white coats the way the motto “To protect and to 
serve” is on every police car in Los Angeles. Technological 
innovations and decision trees to the contrary, this essay’s 
position is that medical “  caring” isn’t the algorithmic appli-
cation of values to a fixed set of variables. Without making 
the judgment excessively harsh on the necessary accrual of 
scientific information in healthcare, every physician should 
be considering the forces that make the work seem like an 
evidence-based medical decision-making Turing machine. Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2011:7 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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We know implicitly, but occasionally need to be reminded 
explicitly, that the “right” choice for a given patient, in a 
particular setting at a particular time in that life, is not neces-
sarily mandated by the literature, or a decision-tree, or even 
by the physician’s experience with other patients.
In this light, the ethical approach to understanding the 
process of establishing risk and benefit for a given patient 
may be illuminated by understanding what conflicts and 
commitments, beliefs and expectations, fears and hopes, are 
operative in the patient’s psyche, and which may be driving 
opinions in decision-making. That may be a tall enough order 
for most us to consider our psychological dues paid. But, alas, 
relational work goes both ways. In order to accomplish the 
task of bringing such insights back to the relationship, and 
reframing the decision process for the patient as it may be 
informed by such dynamics, the physician will likely try to 
understand what is driving him/her-self in the relationship 
with this particular patient, and how such issues of projec-
tion, transference, counter-transference, trust, and emotional 
connectedness prioritize and value what is at stake in moving 
beyond the immediate disagreement.
Carl Schneider points out that the personal bond that once 
existed between doctors and patients, based on trust, faith in 
expertise, and a soul-to-soul connection of one with the other, 
has been shriven by the quest to allow patients autonomy and 
contractual rights. He even goes so far as to say that rights 
have replaced trust in the bioethicist’s imprint of necessary 
impersonality on the present medical service industry.26 Trust 
misplaced is trust betrayed, and one must earn the respect 
and share the value of that trust with those who create the 
relationship defined by it. The whole literature on medical 
professionalism attests to our interest in keeping these issues 
alive and controversial.26,28,31
On the other hand, there are those in our midst who 
cringe at the thought of imputing a moral aspect to profes-
sionalism in medicine, and question whether it plays a role in 
establishing competency.44 To this skeptical audience, we can 
counsel that the work of diagnosing and treating diseases of 
the nervous system, the most complex and adaptive system 
of the body, embodying the organ of individuality, identity, 
awareness, psyche, and selfhood in addition to its manifesting 
of the disease process, should give us pause every time a deci-
sion based on population data is conferred on an individual 
case, and that individual balks at regressing to the mean of 
the grouping which supposedly defines him or her.
Making this reframing process more about the process 
of caring than casuistry contextualizes the issues in the 
relationship of the involved parties, and as such makes the 
ethical issue less about the drug or its risks and benefits. It is 
about how the meanings of things, the feelings, the personal 
and interpersonal power dynamics of a relationship, and 
the sharing and articulation of these critical values, become 
embodied in the roles being played in the decision process, 
and enrich – or potentially additionally wound – the lives of 
those involved.
Conclusion
The commitment physicians make to the health of their 
patients is not solely directed at a particular complaint, 
test result, or diagnosed disease, nor to a given drug or any 
other intervention. Rather, as Steven Sergay so eloquently 
expressed in his 2009 American Academy of Neurology 
annual conference plenary address, there is a duty and 
obligation to imbed expertise, professional authority, opinion, 
and the physician’s personal needs in the act of realizing the 
full individuation and flourishing of the patient.45 Without 
such consideration, physicians’ capacities to establish the 
correct recommendation and guidance for particular patients 
will be inadequate and may result in pain and injury to all 
concerned.
Good medical judgment requires not simply considering 
the obvious health risks attendant to a particular course of 
therapy, but also coming to understand one’s own, and the 
patient’s, values, goals, and unique personal and cultural 
circumstances brought to that therapy as its crucible. As it 
has been put in various contexts, it follows that doctors need 
to listen to patients, to acknowledge the power of the patient’s 
narrative, and doctors must realize the consequences of the 
biopsychosocial aspects of medical care.
But once the physician is doing these things, and even 
doing them well, there may still be a gaping discrepant 
chasm between doctor and patient, unless that   information 
is processed in some way that brings into the equation your 
sense of who you are, your methods of using sensation, 
intuition, thinking, feeling, judging and perception, and 
those same characterologic, temperament and intelligence 
traits of the patient, together. This capacity to be confidently 
vulnerable as you engage with empathy allows the two of 
you to cross over the divide, and come up against the Other. 
How do you know how to manage such interactions, and 
learn to better do so? Are you aware of, and able to work on, 
the psychological impact of such interactions on yourself, 
as well as on the dataset of your specialty area? And if these 
competencies are not in your skill set, can you still practice 
good medicine? What does your character, temperament, 
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situations? What have we allowed our profession to become, 
if such goals are not among our key priorities?
Risk-benefit analysis, cost, and professional associations’ 
manifestos of ethical standards for neurologic practice all 
merit consideration.46,47 Our competence as physicians relies 
on our ability to master the mechanics and information flow 
of our specialty. But situations such as the one profiled in this 
essay seem to require that physicians be aware of how they 
respond to the uniqueness of each of their physician-patient 
relationships, and be willing to explore ways in which the 
psychological and interpersonal dynamics influence ethical 
choices within them. Considering the range of reasons for 
physician burn-out as weaknesses in the financial aspects of 
the American medical market system, and evidence-based and 
population-based medical practice principles, have intruded 
on our autonomy in the doctor-patient relationship, would it 
be unreasonable to ask if some of that frustration is due to 
not being able to create and invest in the kind of interpersonal 
relationships with patients that ultimately feed the physician’s 
soul as much as allow us to deliver excellent care?
Redefining what we do to mediate in cases such as the 
exemplar vignette of this essay goes to the heart of what 
many would like to reclaim as the real work that physicians 
came to their medical career expecting to perform, but have 
been increasingly denied the time, valuation, and even the 
  professional expectation, of the moral authority and psycho-
logical strengths that are required to aspire to, and practice 
good medicine. Some of us are more willing to go down these 
roads than others, and that may bespeak a set of personal 
needs that we bring to our work that reflect what type of per-
sons we are. And neurologists are not clinical   psychologists. 
Neither are we psychiatrists, although the specialties are 
traditionally associated one with the other in their training 
and qualifying procedures. Some physicians are simply not 
going to enjoy or value the approach that is advocated in this 
essay. And that is an interesting fact that is worth exploring, 
in terms of the expectations that the neurological specialty 
has for the competencies of those who choose it. It may be 
that physicians who do not value an overtly psychological, or 
for that matter, a morally defensible, approach to neurology 
practice do a fine job in their work with patients. In the same 
light that society may consider how it can be moral without 
a shared religious basis of that morality, practicing medicine 
without articulating a psychologically-aware position on the 
“right conduct” of that work, is a question that merits further 
investigation.
Intelligent and competent physicians may ultimately reach 
different conclusions in clinical situations such as the one 
described here. It is our challenge to establish how making 
such decisions within a wider and admittedly psychological 
contextual consideration of physician-patient interaction, 
facilitates a broader understanding of how the decision will 
affect the patient’s life and health. It is this essay’s thesis 
that the approach described here makes for better and more 
competent, compassionate doctoring, and perhaps, more 
fulfilled physicians. Attending to such a process of iterative 
reflection and examination and mutual articulation of the usu-
ally unspoken and unacknowledged, might allow   physicians 
serving those who suffer from neurologic complaints and 
diseases, to improve, and enjoy, the care that embodies our 
duty to that patient, the community, and ourselves, in the 
pursuit of human health and well-being.
Notes
Portions of this essay were previously published as the   ethical 
perspectives in neurology article for the   Multiple Sclero-
sis issue of Continuum: Lifelong Learning in   Neurology 
Oct 2010.49
Disclosure
No conflicts of interest were declared in relation to this 
paper.
References
  1.  Kachuck NJ. Challenges and opportunities: what we are learning from 
the natalizumab experience. Expert Rev Neurotherapeutics. 2005;5: 
605–615.
  2.  Cohen JA, Barkhof F, Comi G, et al. Oral fingolimod or intramuscular 
interferon for relapsing multiple sclerosis. N Engl J Med. 2010;362: 
402–415.
  3.  Kappos L, Radue E-W, O’Connor P, et al. A placebo-controlled trial of 
oral fingolimod in relapsing multiple sclerosis. N Engl J Med. 2010;362: 
387–401.
  4.  Rudick RA, Stuart WH, Calabresi PA, et al. Natalizumab plus inter-
feron beta-1a for relapsing multiple sclerosis. N Engl J Med. 2006;354: 
911–923.
  5.  Polman CH, O’Connor PW, Havrdova E, et al. A randomized, placebo-
controlled trial of natalizumab for relapsing multiple sclerosis. N Engl 
J Med. 2006;354:899–910.
  6.  Hauser SL, Johnston SC. Balancing risk and reward: the question of 
natalizumab. Ann Neurology. 2009;66:A7–A8.
  7.  Frohman EF, Goodin SS, Calabresi PA, et al. The utility of MRI in 
suspected MS. Report of the Therapeutics and Technology Assessment 
Subcommittee of the American Academy of Neurology. Neurology. 
2003;61:602–611.
  8.  Montalban X, Tintore M, Swanton J, et al. MRI criteria for MS in patients 
with clinically isolated syndromes. Neurology. 2010;74: 427–434.
  9.  Heesen C, Bohm J, Reich C, Kasper J, Goebel M, Gold SM. Patient 
perception of bodily functions in multiple sclerosis: gait and visual 
function are the most valuable. Mult Scler. 2008;14:988–991.
  10.  Dutta R, Trapp BD. Mechanisms of neuronal dysfunction and degenera-
tion in multiple sclerosis. Prog Neurobiol. 2011;93:1–12.
  11.  Heesen C, Solari A, Giordano A, Kasper J, Köpke S. Decisions on 
multiple sclerosis immunotherapy: new treatment complexities urge 
patient engagement. J Neurol Sci. 2010 Oct 2. [Epub ahead of print].Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment
Publish your work in this journal
Submit your manuscript here: http://www.dovepress.com/neuropsychiatric-disease-and-treatment-journal
Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment is an international, peer-
reviewed journal of clinical therapeutics and pharmacology focusing on 
concise rapid reporting of clinical or pre-clinical studies on a range of 
neuropsychiatric and neurological disorders. This journal is indexed on 
PubMed Central, the ‘PsycINFO’ database and CAS, and is the official 
journal of The International Neuropsychiatric Association (INA). The 
manuscript management system is completely online and includes a 
very quick and fair peer-review system, which is all easy to use. Visit 
http://www.dovepress.com/testimonials.php to read real quotes from 
published authors.
Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2011:7 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
Dovepress
Dovepress
208
Kachuck
  12.  Rudick RA, Stuart WH, Calabresi PA, et al. Natalizumab plus 
interferon beta-1a for relapsing multiple sclerosis. N Engl J Med. 
2006;354:911–923.
  13.  Polman CH, O’Connor PW, Havrdova E, et al. A randomized, placebo-
controlled trial of natalizumab for relapsing multiple sclerosis. N Engl 
J Med. 2006;354:899–910.
  14.  Hutchinson M, Kappos L, Calabresi PA, Confavreux C, Giovannoni G, 
Investigators AFFIRM and SENTINEL. The efficacy of natalizumab 
in patients with relapsing multiple sclerosis: subgroup analyses of 
AFFIRM and SENTINEL. J Neurol. 2009;256:405–415.
  15.  Heesen C, Kleiter I, Nguyen F, et al. Risk perception in natalizumab-
treated multiple sclerosis patients and their neurologists. Mult Scler. 
2010;16:1507–1512.
  16.  Wundes A, Brown T, Biene EJ, Coleman CI. Contribution of intangible 
costs to the economic burden of multiple sclerosis. J Med Econ. 2010;13: 
626–632.
  17.  Weng H-C. Does the physician’s emotional intelligence matter? 
Impacts of the physician’s emotional intelligence on the trust, patient-
physician relationship, and satisfaction. Health Care Manag Rev. 
2008;33:280–288.
  18.  Public Health Service. Tysabri risk minimization action plan: summary 
of TOUCH. Available at: http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Drug 
Safety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/
UCM107197.pdf. Accessed March 15, 2011.
  19.  Kachuck N. REMS, research, and regrets: when is a passive post-
marketing registry insufficient for patient safety? Los Angeles, CA: 
USC Keck School of Medicine; 2011.
  20.  Emanuel E, Emanuel L. Four models of the physician-patient   relationship. 
JAMA. 1992;267:2221–2226.
  21.  Hurst SA, Hull SC, DuVal G, Danis M. How physicians face ethical 
difficulties: a qualitative analysis. J Med Ethics. 2005;31:7–14.
  22.  Krause EA. Death of the guilds: professions, states, and the advance of 
capitalism, 1930 to the present. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 
1996.
  23.  Charles C, Gafni A, Whelan T. Decision-making in the physician/patient 
encounter: revisiting the shared treatment decision-making model. Soc 
Sci Med. 1999;49:651–661.
  24.  Brennan T; Foundation Project of the ABIM, Foundation ACP-ASIM, 
Medicine European Federation of Internal. Medical professionalism 
in the new mellenium: a physician charter. Ann Intern Med. 2002;136: 
243–246.
  25.  Spencer E. Professional ethics. In: Fletcher JC, Boyle R, editors. 
  Introduction to clinical ethics. 2nd ed. Hagerstown, MD: University 
Publishing Group; 1997.
  26.  Schneider CE. The practice of autonomy: patients, doctors, and medical 
decisions. New York City: Oxford Univ Press; 1998.
  27.  Engel GL. The need for a new medical model: a challenge for   biomedicine. 
Science. 1977;196:129–136.
  28. Ludmerer KM. Learning to heal: the development of American 
medical education. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press; 
1985.
  29.  Parascandola M, Hawkins J, Danis M. Patient autonomy and the 
challenge of clinical uncertainty. Kennedy Inst Ethics J. 2002;12: 
245–264.
  30.  Caldicott C, Danis M. Medical ethics contributes to clinical   management: 
teaching medical student to engage patients as moral agents. Med Educ. 
2009;43:283–289.
  31.  Pellegrino ED. The medical profession as a moral community. Bull NY 
Acad Med. 1990;66:221–232.
  32.  Heesen C, Kasper J, Köpke S, Richter T, Segal J, Mühlhauser I. Informed 
shared decision making in multiple sclerosis–inevitable or impossible? 
J Neurol Sci. 2007;259:109–117.
  33.  Kasper J, Köpke S, Mühlhauser I, Nübling M, Heesen C. Informed 
shared decision making about immunotherapy for patients with mul-
tiple sclerosis (ISDIMS): a randomized controlled trial. Eur J Neurol. 
2008;15:1345–1352.
  34.  Redelmeier D, Shafir E. Medical decision making in situations that 
offer multiple alternatives. JAMA. 1995;278:302–305.
  35.  Rose A. Long-term care of patients with multiple sclerosis: a neurolo-
gist’s perspective. Neurology. 1980;30:59–60.
  36.  Burnfield A. Doctor-patient dilemmas in multiple sclerosis. J Med 
Ethics. 1984;10:21–26.
  37.  Leino-Klipi H, Katajisto J. Elements of empowerment and MS patients. 
J Neurosci Nurs. 1998;30:116–123.
  38.  Nelson RF. Ethical issues in multiple sclerosis. Semin Neurol. 
1997;17:227–234.
  39.  Hohlfeld R. Review: ‘Gimme five’: future challenges in multiple 
sclerosis. ECTRIMS Lecture 2009. Mult Scler. 2010;16:3–14.
  40.  Kasper J, Köpke S, Heesen C. Analysing immunotherapy choices using 
the theory of planned behavior. ECTRIMS 2010: Gothenburg, Sweden; 
2010:S167.
  41.  Engel GL. The clinical application of the biopsychosocial model. Am 
J Psychiatry 1980;137:535–544.
  42.  Peabody RW. The care of the patient. JAMA. 1927;88:877–882.
  43.  Marewski J, Gassmaier W, Gigerenzer G. Good judgments do not 
require complex cognition. Cogn Process. 2010;11:103–121.
  44.  Stossel TP. Response to AMA’s Council on ethical and judicial affairs 
draft report on “ethical guidance for physicians and the profession with 
respect to industry support for professional education in medicine”. 
Available at: http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/575760. Accessed 
March 14, 2011.
  45.  Sergay SM. Doctoring 2009: embracing the challenge. Neurology. 
2009;73:1234–1239.
  46.  American Academy of Neurology. AAN Code of Conduct. Available 
at: http://www.aan.com/go/about/ethics/conduct. Accessed March 14, 
2011.
  47.  American Medical Association. Principles of medical ethics. 
  Available at: http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/
medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-ethics.shtml. 
Accessed March 14, 2011.
  48.  Heesen C, Kasper J, Segal J, Kopke S, Muhlhauser I. Decisional role 
preferences, risk knowledge and information interests in patients with 
multiple sclerosis. Mult Scler. 2004;10:643–650.
  49.  Conway J, Kachuck N. Ethical perspectives in neurology: ethical 
considerations of when doctors’ and patients’ attitudes differ on risk 
aversion. Continuum: Lifelong Learning Neurol. 2010;16:234–237.